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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON,

:
Appellate Court No. 20070643

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated July 13, 2007. The
Defendant was sentenced to serve three terms of one to fifteen years, one year
and six months all to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to a matter
the Defendant had previously been sentenced to prison on. Jurisdiction for the
Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(e).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE OFFICER HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE DEFENDANT?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact should be analyzed under
a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of law
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard of review.

"In

reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress,
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, in reviewing the court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of
error standard."

State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App.

1992)(citations omitted).
Preservation—This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant's attorney
filed a motion to suppress and when he entered a Sery plea to the charge. (R.
20-28,63/3).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

§76-6-206. Criminal trespass.
(1)
(2)

As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 766-204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial
terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti as
defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another;

§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
3

(e)

appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with Possession of a
Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, in violation of U.C.A. §58-378(2)(a)(i), a second degree felony; Possession of Drug paraphernalia in a Drug
Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l), and
criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6206(2)(a).
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 20). After a
hearing on the motion, the court denied Defendant's motion. (R. 50). There
were no Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed. The Defendant plead
guilty to all charges and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison where the
sentences on this case were ordered to run concurrent to each other, but
consecutive to another case the Defendant had already been sentenced on. (R.
50-52) The Defendant entered a conditional plea pursuant to State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988 )(R. 63/3). A notice of Appeal was filed on
August 1,2007. (R. 53).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 2, 2007, Officer Francom of the Ogden Police Department
received a dispatch that there was a disturbance in the hills behind some
residences. There was a report that someone thought they heard kids running
around with flashlights and shooting paint ball guns. Approximately five to ten
minutes later, Officer Francom responded to the area which was at 1100 North
Mountain Road. (R. 61/4).
Officer Francom initially spoke with a neighbor in the area who showed
the officer where he saw the people causing the disturbance. Officer Francom
then drove to the Nature Center Parking lot. This parking lot is on the east side
of Mountain Road.

There's a gate around the parking lot except for the

entrance. Behind the parking lot are some trails. (R. 61/5). The trails are
connected with the nature center and also lead up behind the homes where
phone call to dispatch originated from. (R. 61/6).

Officer Francom testified

that "as far as I know, no one is to be in a trailhead from dusk - Fm sorry, from
dark until dusk." (R. 61/6).
When Officer Francom arrived in the parking lot he noticed a vehicle
backed up in the center of the lot facing Mountain Road. (R. 61/7). There
were two occupants of the vehicle. The officer made contact with the driver
who identified himself with his driver's license. (R. 61/8). Officer Francom
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testified that he contacted the driver "because to the best of my knowledge
those individuals were trespassing in a city park after dark." (R. 61/8).
After Officer Francom informed the driver that he was trespassing he
walked around the car and obtained personal information from the front
passenger who is the Defendant in this matter. (R. 61/8-9). After Officer
Francom obtained the Defendant's personal information he went back to his
patrol vehicle and ran both individuals information through his system. He
testified that the individuals were not free to leave while he did this. (R. 61/9).
Officer Francom discovered that there was a warrant out for the
Defendant.

Officer Francom took the Defendant into custody and searched

him incident to arrest. (R. 61/9-11). While Officer Francom was handcuffing
the Defendant he asked him if he had anything illegal on his person. The
Defendant indicated that he had "meth." The officer located methamphetamine
in the Defendant's front pocket. (R. 61/11).
There were pictures of the trailhead admitted into evidence. None of the
signs indicated what time the trailheads closed.

The prosecutor asked the

question of the officer, "So whatever the hours are is just based upon your
understanding about what trailheads are."
"Correct." (R. 61/13).

6

Officer Francom answered,

Although this information was not presented at the evidentiary hearing,
the State alleged in its response to Defendant's motion to suppress that the
Ogden Nature Center is maintained and operated by a private, non-profit
company on land that is leased to them by Ogden City. The Nature Center
trails are closed from dusk until dawn. However, notice of that fact is not
given until after one has left the parking lot and started on the trail. At this
point there is a bulletin board with a sign that reads, 'The park is open from
dawn until dusk." (R. 35-36)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Officer Francom detained the Defendant because he mistakenly believed
that the "Nature Center" was a city park and that Defendant was violating the
city park trespassing ordinance. The Nature Center parking lot is not a city
park, and there is no notice given that one can't be in this parking lot after dark.
Therefore, there were no specific and articulable facts to suggest that the
Defendant was involved in criminal activity when Officer Francom detained
him.
Even though a neighbor reported seeing some kids on the nearby trails,
Officer Francom didn't corroborate in any way that Defendant had been
trespassing on the trails. For these reasons, the evidence that was eventually
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found on Defendant's person should have been suppressed by the trial court as
it was found following an unlawful stop.
ARGUMENT
THE OFFICER
ARTICULABLE
DEFENDANT.

DID NOT
SUSPICION

HAVE
REASONABLE
TO
DETAIN
THE

There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible
encounters between law enforcement officers and the general public.
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been
committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman, 739
P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(citations omitted).
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v.
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In contrast, a level two stop
occurs "when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would
believe he or she is not free to leave." Id.

It is a level two stop "even if the

purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even if the purpose of the stop is
limited and the detention is brief. See, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979).

The same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to

determine if there are sufficient specific and articulable facts to support
reasonable suspicion as is used to determine if there is probable cause. See,
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, "the
State bears the initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop." Id.
In the case at bar, Officer Francom testified that the Defendant was not
free to go while the warrants check was being ran. (R. 61/9). Therefore, this
was a level two detention where the officer needed "specific, articulable facts
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about to
commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The "facts" presented by the State at the suppression hearing were:
(1)

There was a call to dispatch that there was a disturbance
happening in the hills behind some residences where someone
thought they heard kids running around with flashlights shooting
paint ball guns.
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(2)

Five to ten minutes later Officer Francom arrived and spoke with a
resident in the neighborhood.

This individual told Officer

Francom approximately where the people were that he saw.
(3)

There are trails associated with the nature center, but the officer
wasn't sure how they were connected.

(4)

The trails behind the nature center would take someone behind the
homes where the complaint originated from.

(5)

As far as Officer Francom knew, the trails were closed after dark.

(6)

There were photographs of the entrance to the trailhead admitted
into evidence. There were no signs that showed the hours that the
trails are open.

(7)

At the entrance to the trails, there's an "arbor" that you have to
walk under to get on the trails.

(8)

Officer Francom drove to the nature center parking lot and noticed
a vehicle parked there.

(9)

Officer Francom detained the occupants of the vehicle, gathered
their personal information, and then ran a warrants check on them.

(10) Officer Francom detained the occupants of the vehicle because he
believed that they were trespassing in a city park after dark.

(11) During the warrants check, Officer Francom discovered that the
Defendant, who was in the front passenger's seat, had a warrant
for his arrest.
(12) During a search incident to arrest methamphetamine was
discovered in the Defendant's pants pocket.
(R. 61/4-13) Those were the facts that were testified to at the suppression
hearing that the officer relied on to justify his stop of the Defendant. There
was additional information provided in Defendant's and the State's brief that is
included in the record. Defendant submitted a copy of the city ordinance that
prohibits trespassing in city parks. The ordinance specifically requires time
restrictions to be posted at the main entrance to the park. (R. 28).
In the State's response memorandum the State concedes that the nature
center is not a city park subject to the city ordinance.1 The argument the State
made in its memorandum was that Officer Francom had reasonable suspicion
to investigate a trespass. (R. 34-43).
The elements of trespass are;
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if. . .
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i)
intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti. . .

1

Officer Francom testified that he stopped the vehicle because he believed that the occupants were violating
the city park ordinance. (R. 61/8).
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(ii)

intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony;
or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for
the safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or
someone with apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude
intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention
of intruders . . .
U.C.A. §76-6-206.
There was nothing in the facts of this case that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that Defendant had violated that statute. The Defendant was
sitting in a parked vehicle in a parking lot that connects to a trail system in the
Ogden foothills. There was nothing presented at the suppression hearing to
suggest that Defendant was there to cause annoyance, commit a crime or cause
another to fear for his safety.

In addition, there had been no personal

communication to the Defendant, and there were no signs posted for the
parking lot giving notice of the trail hours. There are no specific, articulable
facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the Defendant was
involved in criminal activity. Officer Francom stopped the Defendant based on
his mistaken belief that this parking lot was a city park, and the Defendant was
in violation of the city park ordinance.
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There was nothing in the officer's personal observations that gave him
reasonable suspicion the Defendant was involved in criminal activity.

In

general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable
suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and
inferences." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
However, there are times when an officer can rely on "external
information - e.g., an informant's tip via police dispatch." Kaysville City v.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

"[I]f the investigating

officer cannot provide independent or corroborating information through his or
her own observations, the legality of a stop based on information imparted by
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the
individual originating the information . . . ." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
There are three factors to be considered in determining reasonable
suspicion when information comes from an informant. See, Kaysville City v.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. "As our first factor, we focus on the type of tip or
informant involved." Id.
There is very little known in this case about who the informant was. It
was apparently a neighbor who "heard some kids running around back there,
shooting paint ball guns" in the hills above his home. (R. 61/4). In addition to
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the call to dispatch, Officer Francom talked to an individual in the area who
told Officer Francom where he saw the individuals.

(R. 61/5).

There is

nothing in the record to suggest that this person was not reliable.
The second factor is "whether the informant gave enough detail about
the observed criminal activity to support a stop." Id. at 236. In this case, the
informant reported that there were people on closed trails causing a
disturbance, shooting paint ball guns, etc.
The final factor is whether the police officer's personal observations
confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip. Id. The officer may
corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by finding the
person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the
informant." Id. (quoting, State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. 1994). In the
case at bar, there was no corroboration of the informant's tip as it related to the
Defendant.
There was no evidence presented that would cause a reasonable person
to believe that Defendant was one of the "kids" on the trails. He was a
passenger in a vehicle parked in a nearby parking lot. The officer did not find
the Defendant in the location in the hills where the disturbance was reported.
Furthermore, the officer didn't observe any paintball guns or flashlights or
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observe anything else that would corroborate that Defendant had been in the
hills.
The officer detained the Defendant on the mistaken belief that Defendant
was violating the city's trespassing in a city park ordinance. For these reasons
the officer didn't have reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant and the
evidence which was discovered should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Officer Francom lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant.
The evidence against the Defendant was discovered as a result of this unlawful
detention. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

>rd

DATED this 3rG day of January 2008.

Attorney for Appellant
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Judge:
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 11, 1979
Video
Tape Number:
PRB071207
Tape Count: 11:00-11:02*

5I
u

CHARGES

1. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty
3 . CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for ruling of the court as to the Motion to
Suppress filed by defendant. Defendant is present in custody with
the Utah State Prison and is represented by Michael Bouwhuis,
public defender.
Based on the facts, the Court denies the Motion to Suppress.
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.
Defendant enters a seary plea of guilty to all counts as charged
Page 1

?50

Case No: 071900647
Date:
Jul 12, 2007
and waives time for sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence as to each count and
concurrent with 071901442, however, consecutive to the defendant's
current sentence.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court orders restitution of $297.41 on behalf of Ogden Mini
Mart and Big 5 Sports to be collected by the Department of
Corrections upon the defendant's parole.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 3 65 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL TRESPASS a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 18 0 day(s)

Page 2

Case No: 071900647
Date:
Jul 12, 2007
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The defendant elects to serve the jail in the Utah State Prison.
* Case is recalled on the calendar 11:40-11:49.
Dated

this

JJL day of

%JUh

„

J^OJSLZ

PARLEY R BM.DWIN
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE CLERK:
071900647.

State of Utah versus Derrall Dickerson,

This is time set for a suppression hearing.

MR. DECARIA:

Your Honor, I have a memorandum to

file with -~
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. DECARIA:

-- the Court today

Actually

(unintelligi ble) .
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ready to proceed to take

evidence in this matter?
MR. DECARIA:

We are, Your Honor

I wou.Id call

Officer Jare d Francom to the stand.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr . Bouwhuis, you 1 re ready to proceed?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

We are.

housekeeping , Your Honor.

Just a - - just a matter of

Our intention today is just to

take brief t estimony from the officer, an d then we'll argue
the case later.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Both briefs have now

been filed.
JARED FRANCOM,
being first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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BY MR. DECARIA:
You re Officer Francom with the Ogden City Police

Q.

Is that correct?

Departme nt.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q-

And on the 2nd of Apri 1 of this year you were

dispatch ed to investigate some noise and disturbance in the
neighbor hood of, I guess, 1100 North Mountain Road.

Is that

correct?
A.

Yes

Q-

Describe what the natiire of the dispatch actually

was.

r

sir.

What were you informed?
A.

We irf.ere informed thatthere was a disturbance

happenin g in the hills behind some resid ences.

Some people

thought that they heard some kids runnin g around back there,
shooting pai nt ball guns, with flashligh ts, and stuff like
that.
Q.

Okay.

So after receiving that dispatch, how long

did it take you to get to the area?
A.

Probably no less than five to 10 minutes, somewhere

in there.
Q.

Okay.

Five to 10 minutes?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And where did you go?

A.

At first I drove up a roadway that cut up to the

back of the trails, which I later found out was a private

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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1

driveway when I met the resident of the house.

2

about the approximate area he saw the individuals.

3

drove down his driveway back out onto Mountain Road and went

4

to the nature center parking lot.

5
6
7
8
9

Q.

Okay.

He told me
I then

The nature center parking lot -- describe the

approximate address of that location.
A.

It's approximately 1100 Mountain Road -- North

Mountain Road.
Q.

Okay.

Now, describe the way that's laid out.

10

have you been to that area before on that -- than that

11

night -- other than that night?

12
13
14
15

A.

I've been in that area, but I have not been to the

nature center.
Q.

Okay.

There's a parking lot there.

Is that

correct?

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

All right.

20

A.

It's on the east side of Mountain Road.

21

there.

22

entrance there that allows you to enter.

23

parking lot are some trails that you go back behind.

24
25

Is --

Is that where you proceeded?

Now, describe the parking lot.
You pull in

There's a gate all the way around it except for the
And then behind the

(Counsel confer.)
MR. DECARIA:

Are these your photographs?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395. 1056

MR. BOUWHUIS:
Q

They are.

You can use them.

(BY MR. DECARIA) With regard to the trails, are

those trails connected with the nature center?
A.

As far as I know, yes.

Q.

And how would you know that they were connected with

the nature center?
A.

I just -- I -- as far as I know, they are.

I'm not

sure how they are connected.
Q.

Okay.

Are those trails also the trails that might

proceed up around the back side of the homes that -- where
the neighbors

called?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

So in order to get behind the homes that

you're describing, is the main access to that -- those trails
at that particular sort of trailhead?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

As far as I know, yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now, is that a trailhead, as far as you know?

What is your knowledge as to what the

restrictions are on trailheads?
A.

As far as I know, no one is to be in a trailhead

from dusk -- I'm sorry, from dark until dusk,
Q.

Okay.

So the open hours are from day -- daylight

hours.
A.

Correct.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

Q.

From dawn until dusk --

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

-- is that correct?

4

A.

Yes,sir.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

And where was the vehicle parked?

8

A.

The vehicle was backed up in the center of the

9

So did you see a vehicle in that parking lot?

parking lot, 'not in any parking stall particularly,

10

facing

Mountain Road.

11

Q.

Facing Mountain Road?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

And how far from -- I mean, just if you can estimate

14

in feet, from access to those trails?

15

A.

Fifty feet.

16

Q.

And d i d you c o n t a c t

17

individuals

a s s o c i a t e d with

vehicle?

18

A.

I did.

19

Q.

How many individuals were either there by the

20

vehicle or in the vehicle?

21

A.

There was two.

22

Q.

Were they in the vehicle at the time?

23

I

A.

Yes, sir.

24

|

Q.

Were the doors opened or closed?

25

|

A.

They were both closed.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I first contacted the driver.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Yes, sir.

5

Q.

How did he identify himself?

6

A.

State ID, I believe, or driver's license.

7

And who did you contact first?

1

And was he identified to you?

I

I

can't -- one of those two.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

Yeah, he had a driver's -- identification card.

10

Q.

And for what purpose did you contact the driver?

11

A.

Well, I contacted the driver because to the best of

12

my knowl edge those individuals were trespassing in a city

13

park aft er dark.

14
15

Q.

Okay.

So in other words, your understanding is that

trailhea ds are essentially city park?

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

And that if someone is in there that they're

18

trespassing if the -- if they're beyond -- previous to

19

dusk -- I mean, beyond dusk and before dawn?

20

A.

Yes, sir.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

I did.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

Did you inform the driver of that?

And did you then contact the passenger of the

vehicle as well?
A.

Yes,sir.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

1

Q.

And how did you do that?

2

A.

Just walked around the car and -- let's see.

3

as far as I remember, I walked around the car and just

4

gathered his information as well.

5

across.

I may have just leaned

I don't remember.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

Right.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

No, sir.

10

Q.

Did he identify himself to you?

11

A.

Yes, sir.

12

Q.

Okay.

13
14
15
16

Through the driver's side window?

Did you actually get ID from that passenger?

And after he identified himself, what did you

then do?
A.

At that point I went back to my patrol vehicle, ran

both of individuals' identification through the system.
Q.

Okay.

Now, you didn't have identification for the

17

passenger, but you had formal ID, driver's license or

18

whatever, in your hand from the driver.

19

A.

Yes, sir.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

No, sir.

22

Q.

Okay.

23
24
25

Yeah,

Is that correct?

So at that point they weren't free to leave.

So you got on your computer -- how did you

verify identification and whatnot?
A.

I just ran both names and date of birth they gave

me, the one from the identification card, the other one by

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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what the passenger told me.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And there was actually a mugshot located on file for

the passenger to verify that he was who he said he was.
Q.

Okay.

Referring strictly to the passenger, then,

you ran his name and date of birth?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you got identification which included a

photograph.

Is that correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And did the photograph when you saw it on your

computer screen appear to be the person that you had
contacted?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

So at that point did you learn something

about this individua 1?
A.

Yes, sir.

I learned that he had a felony three, no

bail warrant from th e Board of Pardons.
Q.

Okay.

So at what -- at that time what did you do?

A.

At that time I recontacted the passenger, and he was

taken into custody.
Q.

You took him into custody right then?

A.

Yes,sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now, as part of the normal custody, did you

search the individual?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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1

A.

I did.

2

Q.

And did you find something on him that you believed

3

to be contraband?

4

A.

I did.

5

Q.

Where did that -- was that in the parking lot where

6
7

10

that was found?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And how did you find it?

A.

It was on his —

it was in his pants pocket when I

was searching him.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

He identified it to me, and then I found it where he

13

Did you find it or did he find it?

said it was.

14

Q.

So how did he identify it to you?

15

A.

I asked him if there was anything

16

person while I was handcuffing him.

17

meth.

18
19

Q.

Okay.

illegal on his

He said, Yes, I have

So then you reached in, you found it, you

pulled it out?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q

And you had seen substances like that before?

22

A

Yes, sir.

23

Q

That you knew to be meth?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

Okay.

Did you believe that to be meth at that time?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

11

A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

He was arrested on a warrant.

Did you also

book him on possession of methamphetamine?
A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

I want to show you some pictures.

We've sort

of moved beyond it, but I want to show you some pictures that
are marked for the purpose of identification and ask if you
recognize these.

These are marked as State's exhibits

although they're actually defendant's copies of these
photographs.

Do you recognize that?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And what is that?

A.

That's the trailhead parking lot.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yeah, that's where you come in off Mountain Road

This may be a better view of it.

This is No.

2?

right there.
Q.

Okay.

A.

The entrance to the trailhead is part, I believe.

Q.

That's the entrance -- the actual entrance to the

trailhead.

And then this is No. 3.

What is this?

You have to walk under that -- that facility --

it looks like an arbor of some sort -A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

-- to get on there?

another picture of same thing.

Okay.

Thank you.

No. 4,

Is that right?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

A.

Yes, sir.

2

Q.

And No. 5 may be the same.

3

A.

Yes, sir.

4

Q.

Are there any markings there that say anything about

Is that correct?

5

the hours, or did you see -- whether they're in the

6

photographs or not, did you see any signs that talk about the

7

hours?

8

A.

No, sir.

9

Q.

So whatever the hours are is just based upon your

10

understanding about what trailheads are.

11

A.

12

Correct.
MR. DECARIA:

Okay.

I have no further questions of

13

the witness except to ask that these items be admitted into

14

evidence.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BOUWHUIS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BOUWHUIS:

19

THE WITNESS:

No, sir.

20

MR. DECARIA:

Do you want me to get them back?

21

MR. BOUWHUIS:

22

25

No objection.

Thank you.

They are received.

You still have the photos?

Yeah, if you could just hand them to

the witness, please.

23
24

Thank you.

THE WITNESS:
I

MR. BOUWHUIS

Thank you.
You know what?

Actually I don't have

any questions, Your Honor

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

2

You may stand down.

3

Mr. DeCaria?

4

MR. DECARIA:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Nothing further, Your Honor.
Mr. Bouwhuis?
As I indicated earlier, Your Honor, I

7

just -- I just received his -- his brief on this.

8

decided to take testimony today, but I would like an

9

opportunity to review that and then argue on another

10

occasion.

11
12
13
14

THE COURT:

Okay.

How much time?

When do you want

this set?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Whatever your calendar will

accommodate, couple of weeks.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. DECARIA:

17

THE COURT:

18

28th, nine o'clock.

Mr. DeCaria?
It's fine with the State, Your Honor.
Thank you.

19

MR. BOUWHUIS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DECARIA:

22

We've

We'll set this, then, on the

2 8th?

June.
I apologize.

I will not be here on

the 28th.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. BOUWHUIS:

25

THE COURT:

21st of June.

Okay.

The Court will retain these pictures in

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1
2
3

the file
Mr. Dickerson, I'll see you back here then
(End of proceedings.)
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I STATE OF UTAH

)

2

| COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter

4

| in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the

5

| foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the

6

I videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled

7

matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or
10

employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a

11

relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or

12

financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

13
14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and

15

seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 8th day of August, 2007.

16
17
18
19
20

*lWi/OU Co, 3
Diane W. Flanagan
Official Court Reporter
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^ O N D DISTRICT COU*T

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS - 6498
Attorney For Defendant
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 201
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 393-6452
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

:

DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON,
Defendant.

:
:

Case No. 071900647
Judge Parley R. Baldwin

COMES NOW the defendant, Derrall Craig Dickerson, by and through his attorney of
record, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
his Motion to Suppress.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
On the evening of April 1, 2007, at about 11:10 p.m., Officer Jared Francom of the Ogden
Police Department was dispatched to the Nature Center located at 1100 North, Mountain Road,
in Ogden, Utah. A refused complainant had reported that "there were people running around
behind some houses in the foothills. The complainant also said that there was a vehicle parked in
the parking lot of the Nature Center."

• — -.i Tiaii'aiiiftiiit liiii'i'iiTiiii

CD19624989

pages:

071900647 DICKERSON,DERRALL CRAIG

0^£

When Officer Francom arrived, he made contact with two individuals sitting in the
vehicle. Defendant was a passenger. Officer Francom informed the passengers that they were
trespassing because it was after dark, then ran their names for warrants. Defendant had a warrant
for his arrest, and Francom arrested him. Francom asked Defendant if he had anything on his
person Francom should know about, to which Defendant replied that he had some
methamphetamine, which was indeed found on his person.
Defendant was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance (DFZ), Second Degree
Felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (DFZ), Class A Misdemeanor.
ARGUMENT
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Utah Supreme Court has held that there are three levels of policecitizen encounters, each of which requires a different degree of justification to be constitutionally
permissible.
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable
suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop;"
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Merritt, 736 FJ2d 223, 230 (5th CirJ984)). To pass muster under the fourth amendment, the

2

seizure must be based on specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn
from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude the defendant had committed or was
about to commit a crime. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the requirement that an officer must
have a reasonable suspicion to stop a person in Terry v. Ohio, U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Court in Terry stated:
In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion . . . In making that assessment it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard . . . . Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Id. at 21-22. The requirement of reasonable suspicion has also been codified in Section 77-7-15,
Utah Code Annotated (1990) :
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed, or is in the act
of committing, or is attempting to commit a public offense, and
may demand his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
Under this section, a police officer may detain an individual if he or she has an articulable
suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
617-18 (Utah 1987). There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable suspicion.
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). Whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances. Id. The "totality of the circumstances"
analysis must be based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418,

j

101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.
199J).
In this case, Officer Francom responded to the scene and approached the defendant based
on his belief that a city trespassing ordinance applied to that particular location and that the
defendant was in violation of that ordinance. Ogden City does indeed have a trespassing
ordinance which makes it unlawful for persons to enter city parks at any time from one hour after
sunset to one hour before sunrise. Ogden City Ordinance 11-3-2. The ordinance also requires
that the time restrictions be posted at the main entrance to the park. (A copy of this ordinance is
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A").
This particular location, however, has two problems that render the trespassing ordinance
inapplicable: 1) the Nature Center appears to be more of a trailhead than a city park,1 and 2) there
is no sign posted indicating the time restrictions for entrance. (See copies of photos of the area,
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit UB").
At the time the preliminary hearing in this matter was waived, the State stipulated that the
officer, if called to testify, would say that he does not recall seeing a "no trespassing" sign
posted, but was relying on the city trespassing ordinance in responding to the scene and "seizing"
the defendant.

x

The question of whether the location at issue is a trail head or a city park is probably
moot for purposes of this motion, however, because the ordinance requires the time restrictions
to be posted at the main entrance to the park. Therefore, if the location is a park, the ordinance is
not met because there is no sign posted. If it's not a park, a sign need not be posted because the
trespassing ordinance does not apply.
4

CONCLUSION
The sole basis for Officer Francom's suspicion of criminal activity was his belief that the
city's trespassing ordinance applied to the area and the defendant's presence in the area. This
belief, however, was not reasonable because Ogden City's trespassing ordinance does not apply:
either the area was not a city park, or the required time restrictions were not posted.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant asks that the evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal stop be suppressed and that the charges be dismissed. "If a seizure occurs and the police
are unable to point to specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, the seizure violates
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal seizure must be excluded." " State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (Evidence obtained
subsequent to an illegal stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree.")
DATED t h i s / 4

day of May 2007.

MICHAEL D.vBOUWHUlS-3
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
with postage prepaid thereon, to Weber County Prosecutor, 2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd FL,
Ogden UT 84401, this / (f day of May 2007.

4•- ^h-/:'j
Secretary
5
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EXHIBIT "A"

-3-2: TRESPASSING ON CITY PARKS, CEMETERIES AND ...

http://www.sterlingcodifiers.eom/UT/Ogden/l3003000000002000.htm

11-3-2: TRESPASSING ON CITY PARKS, CEMETERIES AND GOLF
COURSES:
A. Parks: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon any City park at any time from one
hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when participating in or attending an
activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and except for
persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway.
B. Cemetery: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City cemetery at any time
from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except for the day before Memorial
Day and Memorial Day, when the hours when no person shall enter or be upon the City
cemetery shall be between ten o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M.
C. Golf Courses: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City golf courses between
the hours of ten o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M.
D. Posting Of Time Restrictions: The time restrictions shall be posted at the main entrance to
the park, cemetery, or golf course.
E. Violation; Penalty: A violation of this Section is a Class C misdemeanor, subject to the
penalties provided under Title 1, Chapter 4 of this Code.

(1979 Code § 9.03.020; Ord. 98-46, 6-23-1998)
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MARK R. DECARIA, UBN 0850
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]1
>
]

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON,

])

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Case No. 071900647

JUfil - „ ,
(

)

Defendant.

)

c

Judge: Parley R. Baldwin

COMES NOW, Mark R. DeCaria, Weber County Attorney, and respectfully submits this
Memorandum of Law to support the State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.

i to Defendant's Motion to Suppress E

CD19659303
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DICKERSON,DERRALL CRAIG

OH

FACTS
The Arrest
Near midnight1 on April Fool's Day (April 1, 2007), Officer Francom responded to a
trespassing complaint that there were people running around behind houses in the foothills by
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Upon arrival, Officer Francom viewed a vehicle parked in the
ONCN parking lot, just as the caller had described. Two men occupied the vehicle. Officer
Francom approached the two males, informed them that they were trespassing, and asked them
both for identification. The vehicle's passenger did not have identification but verbally identified
himself as Derrall "Craig" Dickerson. Upon running Dickerson's name, Officer Francom found
that Dickerson had a warrant for his arrest.2 Officer Francom arrested Dickerson and later found
methamphetamine on his person.
Ogden Nature Center, North
The ONCN3 is an annex of the Ogden Nature Center (ONC)4. Both the ONC and ONCN
are maintained and operated by a private, non-profit company on land that is leased to them by
Ogden City. The ONC has limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. The ONCN also has
limited hours of operation—closed from dusk until dawn.

'23:10 Hours
In total, Dickerson had an NCIC hit, a felony three no bail warrant for his arrest from the board of pardons,
and a misdemeanor warrant from Weber county.
3
Located at 1175 N. Mountain Rd., Ogden, Utah 84404. The ONCN is just North of where Harrison Boulevard
becomes Mountain Road.
4
Located at 966 W. 12th Street, Ogden, Utah 84404.
2

There are two signs near the ONCN entrance indicating that the area is part of the
ONC—one at the main entrance to the parking lot and another on a wooden recycle bin near the
park's entrance. The parking lot is surrounded by a wooden fence, and the rest of the trail along
Mountain Road is blocked by a chain fence. The wooden fence surrounding the parking lot opens
for a wooden arbor—the entrance. The trail is only accessible through the entrance beyond the
parking lot. Just through the arbor there is a bulletin board on which there is a sign that reads,
'The park is open from dawn until dusk." Other than the ONCN trail, the area around Mountain
Road is residential with some properties boarding the ONCN property.
ARGUMENT
I.
OFFICER FRANCOM'S STOP AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
REASONABLE UNDER THE 4™ AMENDMENT
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the
14th Amendment and adopted by the Utah State Constitution, only protects persons against
searches and seizures that are unreasonable.1 US. Const. Amend. IV. Utah Const.Art. I, § 14.
Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). A reasonable search and seizure balances the
competing interests of a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy against law enforcement's
legitimate interest in crime prevention and investigating criminal activity. State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Whether a search
and seizure is reasonable is detemiined by a fact-intensive inquiry guided by a two-part analysis:
(1) whether the officer's actions were justified at their inception and (2) whether the resulting
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." U.S. Const.
Amend. IV. Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.
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detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place. Lopez at 1132.
At issue here is whether a stop and seizure of a person, the defendant, was reasonable.
There are three levels of reasonable, constitutionally permissible police to public encounters
which may qualify as a seizure of a person: (1) an officer may approach a citizen and ask
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person
if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has, is, or is about to commit a
crime, and so long as the detention is temporary and lasts no longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect so if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the person has, is, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616,
617 (Utah 1987).
A level two encounter is at issue here as the question presented is, first, whether Officer
Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and question the defendant, and, second,
whether Officer Francom acted within the reasonable scope of the stop in running a warrants
check on the defendant. Both questions are answered in the affirmative.
A.

Officer Francom Had Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Stop the Defendant and
Investigate a Possible Trespass.
Under a level two encounter, a police officer may detain and question any person when

the officer has an objective reasonable, articulable suspicion that person has, is, or is about to be
involved in criminal activity. State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987). To amount to
reasonable, articulable suspicion, the likelihood of criminal activity must be more than a hunch
but need not rise to the level of persuasiveness of probable cause or the preponderance of the
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evidence standard. State v. Alverez, 147 P.3d 425 (Utah 2006). State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507,
509-10 (Utah 2005). Further, whether a seizure is reasonable and constitutional does not depend
on whether the defendant is actually guilty of committing a crime but whether the officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being committed. Whether a crime actually
occurred is a question to be determined at trial.
Reasonable, articulable suspicion is supported by an objective analysis of specific,
articulable facts and logical inferences from those facts. Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1994). Whether those facts amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion depends upon the totality
of the circumstances, not individual facts viewed in isolation. Markland at 510. Alverez at 432.2
To support reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may rely on his training, experience, and
subjective belief. Alverez at 432. An officer's suspicion may also be based on information
received from another person if that "tip" bears some indicia of reliability. Id at 433. An officer
may additionally rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory stop. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932 at 940 (Utah 1994).
Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and
investigate a possible trespass. Near midnight, on April Fool's Day, Officer Francom responded
to a complaint that there were people running around in the foothills behind some houses on
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Complying with his duty to investigate complaints, Officer

2

In determining whether a police officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion, the courts may not use a "divide
and conquer analysis." In other words, they cannot determine the individual facts in isolation to determine whether
each fact has an innocent explanation. Rather, the courts must look to the :totality of the circumstances" to
determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further investigation by a police officer. State v. Alverez. at
432.
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Francom arrived to find a car in the ONCN parking lot, thus confirming part of the complaint to
which the officer was responding, thereby showing that the complaint was reliabable.
Two men sat in the car. The parking lot, but for their car, was empty. The trail past the
parking lot was fenced off, both around the parking lot and along Mountain Road, thus indicating
that use of the trail was somewhat restricted and that a certain level of privacy was wanted. Given
the darkness and lateness of the hour, the trail was likely not fit to be hiked upon.3 Given the
lapse of time between the complaining call and Officer Francom's response, the two men in the
car were probably in the dark, empty parking lot for an unreasonable amount of time.
Additionally, given that the trail is only accessible through the entrance in the parking lot where
these two men were parked, coupled with the residential nature of the area and the established
reliability of the complaining call, it is reasonable that these two men could have been the people
running around in the foothills behind houses, alarming the residents.
All these facts and their rational inferences, looked at together as the totality of the
circumstances created a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had occurred or was
occurring. Further, the possibility that a trespass has occurred or was occurring gave Officer
Francom a duty to investigate.
B.

A Warrants Check on the Defendant Was Within the Reasonable Scope of the
Detention as Part of Officer Francom's Trespass Investigation
Once an officer stops a person for a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime has, is,

or is about to be committed, that detention may continue so long as it is temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Dietman, 739 P. 2d 616,

3

Additionally, had the two men intended to use the trail for hiking, as it is supposed to be used, they would
have seen the hours of operation immediately after walking through the arbor.
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617 (Utah 1987). For example, running a warrants check on a properly stopped driver does not
exceed the scope of detention, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention
beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and issue a
citation. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994).
Running a warrants check is an appropriate form of investigation and does not exceed the
scope of detention even if a person is stopped for something other than a traffic violation. State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995). In State v. Chapman, the defendant and another
person were parked in an empty school parking lot after dark, late at night. Id. An officer stopped
the defendant for violating a loitering ordinance. Id. The defendant identified himself to the
officer, after which the officer ran a warrants check on the defendant, which came back negative.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court found this stop reasonable because the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the loitering ordinance was being violated. Id. Additionally, the scope
of the stop was reasonable because, though not a "routine traffic stop," the warrants check was a
reasonable form of investigation that did not "significantly extend the period of detention beyond
that reasonably necessary . . . . " Id.
A warrants check on the defendant was within the reasonable scope of detention as part of
Officer Francom's trespass investigation. Similar to Chapman, wherein a warrants check was
reasonable as part of an investigation for a loitering ordinance violation, it was likewise
reasonable for Officer Francom to investigate a trespass by running a warrants check on the
defendant. Running a warrants check is a valid form of investigation so long as it does not
significantly extend the period of detention, and there is no indication that the defendant was
detained any longer than necessary for the officer to investigate the possible trespass.
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II.
THE OGDEN CITY MUNICIPAL CODE AGAINST TRESPASSING IN CITY PARKS
DOES NOT APPLY TO THE OGDEN NATURE CENTER, NORTH
The Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) makes it unlawful for any person to enter or be
upon any city park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise.1 Ogden City
Ordinance 11'-3-2(A). Additionally, that time restriction must be posted at the park's main
entrance.2 Ogden City Ordinance ll-3-2(D).
Neither the Ogden Nature Center (ONC) nor the Ogden Nature Center, North (ONCN)
are a public city park or trail head as neither are listed as public city parks3 or trail heads4 on the
Ogden City website.5 Additionally, the ONC and ONCN are operated by a private, non-profit
company on land that is leased to them by Ogden City. The ONC is not free to public access as
there are limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. Though an annex with no entrance fee,
the ONCN also has limited hours of operation, closed from dusk until dawn. These hours of
operation are posted just past the trail's entrance.
Because the ONC and ONCN are not public city parks, the criminal trespassing statute6,
and not the OCMC, applies. However, even if the ONCN were a public city park subject to the
OCMC, the reasonableness of a seizure is not detennined by whether the ordinance was actually

1

Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: A. Parks: "It is unlawful for any person to enter or
be upon any City park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when
participating in or attending an activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and
except for persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-3-2(A).
2
Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: D. Post of Time Restrictions: "The time restrictions
shall be posted at the main entrance to the park, cemetery, or golf course." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-32(D).
3
List of Ogden City Public Parks: http://www.ogdenci^.com/index.php?module:=ibcms&fxn=parks.main
4
List of Ogden Trail Networks: http://www.ogdencitYxom/index.php?n'iodule=ibcms&fxri:=:ogdentrails.mairi
5
Ogden City website: http://www.ogdencih-.com/
6
Criminal Trespass Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (2007).
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violated but by whether Office Francom has reasonable, articulable suspicion to think that a
trespass had occurred or was occurring. Whether a trespass actually occurred is a question to be
determined at trial. Because of the reasoanble, articulable suspicion presented by the facts above,
Officer Francom still had a duty to investigate a possible trespass and it is this investigation that
led to the defendant's eventual arrest followed by the discovery of drugs on the defendant's
person.
CONCLUSION
First, Officer Francom conducted a constitutional seizure with requisite reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or was occurring. The complaining call
and its subsequent verification, the car in an otherwise empty parking lot, the lateness and
darkness of the hour, the limited accessibility of the trail coiipled with the restriction and privacy
indicated by the surrounding fence, and the otherwise residential nature of the area are all
articulable facts creating a totality of the circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred
that the two men in the car were not using the parking lot and trail for legitimate purposes and,
thus, that some sort of a criminal activity was occurring-most likely, a trespass.
Second, once Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had
occurred or was occurring he only detained the defendant as long as necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop. Officer Francom investigated by running a warrants check which is a
legitimate form of investigation for stops, whether they are traffic related or not.
Third, the Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) against trespassing does not apply to the
ONCN because the trail is run by a private, non-profit company and it is not considered a public
city park or trail head by Ogden City. Additionally, even if the OCMC against trespassing did
-9-

apply to the ONCN, whether or not a trespass actually occurred is irrelevant. The question,
instead, is whether Office Francom had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was ongoing
criminal activity which gave him a duty to investigate.
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. Dated the jf

day of June, 2007.
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Mark DeCaria
Deputy Weber County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
thereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing on
t h i s ^ J ^ d a y of June, 2007, a copy of the STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to:
Michael D. Bouwhuis
Attorney for the Defendant
2564 Washington Blvd., Suit 201
Ogden, Utah 84401
telephone: (801) 393-6452
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